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As a consequence of the recent global financial crisis, the current economic environment 
emphasized the weak correlation between company performance and the incentives 
received by the management staff. Therefore, the existence and consistent implementation 
of best practices regarding the propelling of the management staff through incentives can 
lead to a tenable company development. The purpose of this article consists in studying 
existing methods of incentive granting from a value management perspective and in 
suggesting some alternatives that could be used by companies during a volatile period 
characterized by financial economic challenges. 
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The financial economic evolution of the last four years has been characterized by 
uncertainty and precariousness, two direct effects of the global financial crisis. During such 
time periods, the creation of clear strategies and a consistent pursuit of their implementation 
can make the difference between bankruptcy and company tenable development. The large 
corporation’s executives’ appetence for taking short – term excessive risks with a view to 
reaching the performance indicators and, upon this basis, the procurement of important 
incentives, is considered one of the causes of the recent financial crisis that occurred within 
the US banking financial system and subsequently dispersed at world level (Stiglitz, 2010). 
Best practices must have as main objective the avoidance of moral hazard manifestation. A 
suggestive example is the comparative analysis of the actual financial results and of 
incentive funds granted for the American investment banks (table no.1). Thus, although the 
actions performed by the investment banks’ management staff did not trigger the reaching 
of performance targets, managers have received significant incentives paid in actual fact by 
the common American taxpayer through the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) 
system operated by the American government.  . 
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1.400 945  42.900  32.634  22.028  3.000 
Citigroup -27.700  5.330  322.800 -85.812  16.512  45.000 
Goldman 
Sachs  2.322 4.823  30.067  77.228  160.420  10.000 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase Co.  5.600 8.693  224.961 24.893  38.642  25.000 
Merrill 
Lynch  -27.600 3.600  59.000  -467.797  61.017  10.000 
Morgan 
Stanley  1.707 4.475  46.964  36.437  95.286  10.000 
State Street 
Co.  1.811 470  28.475  63.600  16.505  2.000 
Wells Fargo  -42.933 977  281.000  -152.786  3.479  25.000 
Source: Cuomo, 2009. 
 
1. The Agency theory 
According to the agency theory, the rapports between the various participants in the 
company’s activity are based on contracts, while the consequence of the enterprise’s 
conduct is the effect of arbitrations and equilibriums between their specific interests thus 
allowing the analysis of the impact of various financial decisions, risk and profitability 
relevant, upon the earnings of all interest-holders (David and Petcu, 2008). 
The agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) assumes that there is a contract – 
based relationship between shareholder and agent (the manager delegated to run the 
company) by which the latter is bound to achieve some specific targets. Nevertheless, if 
both parties wish to maximize utility, there is strong evidence to believe that the agent 
(manager) will not act in the investors’ interest but in his own. In this respect,  taking into 
account the informational asymmetry (the manager holds more information and takes 
current decisions on behalf of the investor), a moral hazard situation may occur if the 
manager’s interests are not similar to those of the investors. Thus, an upstanding 
remuneration given to the agent (manager) is not, according to Jensen and Meckling, an 
optimal solution. This type of remuneration would make the manager draw away from the 
formerly established targets as his reward would be independent of his work quality 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). 
Therefore the shareholder will try to limit the negative effects by offering incentives and 
bonuses, which make up the agency cost. Replacing fixed remuneration by bonuses that 
reflect performance is a much more efficient method for limiting these effects (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). Amfiteatru Economic recommends  AE 
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Theoretically, the performance – related incentive granting decision has the role to reduce 
the agent’s impetus to draw away from the established targets and to diminish the moral 
hazard (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
2. Best practices in incentive compensation  
The best practices in incentive granting strategies are based on the attitude of the 
organization members with a view to the achievement of the established target. In this 
respect, the „focus on participant” plays a significant role by trying to understand the 
psychological process of participant stimulation and motivation within an incentive 
granting program. The „focus on participant” theory is associated with Skinner’s ABC 
behavior model (Achievement Awards Group, 2007) (figure no.1). 
Figure no. 1: Skinner’s ABC Behaviour Model 
Source: Skinner, 1957, p.124 
Created by the behavioral psychiatrist B. F. Skinner (1957), the ABC model reveals the 
three categories of factors that positively influence the performance level, as presented 
below:  
 The antecedents supplying people with the resources necessary for the achievement 
of performance targets. Communication abilities, knowledge and expertise allow for the 
identification of actions that must be performed as well as for the specific methods of 
implementation; 
 Behavior consists in the set of actions adopted by management with the purpose of 
achieving the pre-established targets; 
 Consequences must be positive and reflective of active types of behaviour while 
discouraging passive ones. 
Behavioral changes are actually the effect of the answer that the individual gives to the 
signals (stimuli) manifested within the environment.  
Young and O’Byrne (2000) present four basic objectives that companies must pursue with a 
view to realizing the incentive granting policies: 
 Alignment: granting the management enough incentives for the choice of strategies 
and investments that may lead to maximizing the value for shareholders; AE                    Best Practices in Incentive Compensation  
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 Leverage effect (multiplying income for management): offering enough incentives 
for management staff in order for them to work harder, assume risks, make difficult 
decisions and maximize value for shareholders; 
 Keeping: offering enough incentives for the management in order to keep them even 
in diminished performance for the company triggered by the evolution of the market; 
 Cost for shareholders: limiting costs for shareholders in granting incentives for the 
management staff so that it may bring an added value for shareholders. 
According to Martin and Petty (2000), the policies for incentives granting must answer 
three fundamental questions: 
 What is the level of incentives that must be granted? 
 What is the relationship between incentive granting and performance? 
 What are to-be-paid incentives made up of? 
In order to establish the incentives to be paid, one can follow the performance levels to be 
reached. Below (figure no. 2), we are presenting a general scheme establishing the 
relationship that exists between the granting of bonuses and the established performance.  
 
Figure no. 2: General scheme for performance- bonus 
Source: Young and O’Byrne, 2000, p.114 
The main aim of incentives is, as we mentioned above, to solve the agency issue, making 
the management’s interests compatible with those of shareholders. The tools for incentive 
granting (types of bonuses apart from fixed remuneration) include: short-term bonuses, 
long-term bonuses, additional benefits (pension plans, health insurance etc.), shares, 
options, as well as other payment methods that vary according to each company. 
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3. Incentives Granting Systems and Indicators from the Value Management 
Perspective   
Starting from the principle according to which the company’s target determines the used 
measurement instruments and therefore the incentive granting policy, in the case of value 
management, at the core of the incentive granting policy there are well-known instruments: 
economic value added (EVA), cash flow return on investment (CFROI), market value 
added (MVA), total shareholder return (TSR). 
Nevertheless, a problem occurs at this stage: choosing the appropriate performance 
measurement instrument that would not create a stimulus for the manager to draw away 
from the established targets. The choosing of performance measurement instruments 
implies problems related to the way the company management will concentrate on 
achieving the established target for the used instrument, and the lack of a global view on the 
general target of value maximization for shareholders being at the same time liable for the 
interested parties. The use of a performance measurement instrument and the establishment 
of an incentive granting system based on a different indicator may lead to negative results. 
 It is important that the performance measurement tool to determine the system of incentive 
compensation (Young and O'Byrne, 2000). 
The performance measurement instruments that start from accounting results have the 
disadvantage of the management’s easefulness of manipulation through the application of 
various accounting treatments: amortizations, provisions, etc. Thus, the achievement of 
such targets by managers does not mean value maximization for shareholders. Yet, the 
achievement of such targets can be a short-term one, thus sacrificing future potential 
increase. The second objective, leverage effect (multiplying the management’s income) is a 
consequence of the obtained results. Thus, in 91.11% of companies the CEO that does not 
possess significant shares in the company must have sufficient incentives for the decisions 
that he makes to be in full accordance with the shareholders’ expectations. 
General model of incentive granting  
A general method of establishing manager incentives, irrespective of the used indicator, is 
presented by Young and O’Byrne (2000): 
Incentive A = Fr* Ars* (Vo/Vt)                         (1) 
in which: 
Incentive A – granted incentive; 
Fr – fixed remuneration; 
Ars – assumed risk surplus as offered percentage, independent of company performance; 
Vo – value obtained of indicator and  
Vt – value – target of indicator. 
Example: 
Fixed salary (remuneration) in year N is 2,300,400 lei 
Surplus for assumed risk is of 15% AE                    Best Practices in Incentive Compensation  
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The ratio between the obtained value of MVA and the targeted value for MVA is of 1.2. 
Thus, the granted incentive = 414,072 lei 
Total obtained benefits = fixed remuneration + granted incentive = 2,714,472 lei. 
15.25% of obtained benefits represent the granted incentive (bonus).  
Through this model, we can use whatever measurement instrument for value added closely 
related to the short and medium term company strategy. 
Using economic value added in the granting of bonuses 
The specialty literature offers clear examples of the way in which the EVA indicator is used 
in establishing the incentives granted for the company management and employees.The 
basic plan (Young and O’Byrne, 2000) assumes that the establishment of the incentives’ 
value for management to be calculated as a percentage of the economic value added.  
Granted incentive = x% * EVA                             (2) 
in which: 
Incentive A – granted incentive (bonus); 
x% - negotiated percentage of bonus and  
EVA  –  economic  value  added.         
This system also has certain disadvantages related to the negotiations of the incentive 
percentage. Thus, during value increase and creation, the percentage might lead to a much 
bigger incentive. On the other hand, a negative value of EVA would lead to no bonus 
grating. We have presented (figure no. 3) the graph version of this type of bonus granting 
system. 
Figure no. 3: The basic plan for bonus rewarding using EVA 
Source: Young and O’Byrne, 2000, p.135 Amfiteatru Economic recommends  AE 
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Another issue refers to the target established for the economic value added. Bennet Stewart 
(1991) considers that negotiating the target for EVA is not a solution. On the other hand, 
revising this target yearly would be more useful both for managers and shareholders.  
The equation suggested by Steward is the following: 
EVAtn+1= EVAtn + B% (EVAan - EVAtn)                                                             (3) 
in which: 
EVAtn+1 – target for the economic value added in the year N+1; 
EVAtn – target for the economic value added in the year N; 
B% - the percentage of the difference between actual EVA and targeted EVA required for 
the following year; it can have values between 0% and 100% and  
EVAan – actual economic value added in N. 
Example: 
We assume that a company had in year N an attainment target of EVA of 1,500,000 lei. 
Thus, the new EVA target will be different depending on the percentage value of B% (table 
no.2). 
Table no. 2: The target of EVA for different levels of percentage B% 
EVA (N) (lei)  B%  EVA obtained in N  - EVA(N)   EVA (N+1)  
1.250.000 0%  250.000  1.250.000 
1.250.000 10%  250.000  1.275.000 
1.250.000 20%  250.000  1.300.000 
1.250.000 30%  250.000  1.325.000 
1.250.000 40%  250.000  1.350.000 
1.250.000 50%  250.000  1.375.000 
1.250.000 60%  250.000  1.400.000 
1.250.000 70%  250.000  1.425.000 
1.250.000 80%  250.000  1.450.000 
1.250.000 90%  250.000  1.475.000 
1.250.000 100%  250.000  1.500.000 
At a 0% value of the B%, the EVA target will remain unchanged, but at a 100% of the B% 
the target increases by the difference between the actual EVA in the year N and the EVA 
target of the year N. (table no. 3 and figure no. 4) 
Table no. 3: Calculation of EVA target for a B% of 50% 
  N  N+1 N+2 N+3 N+4 N+5 
EVA (N)  1.250.000 1.375.000 1.437.500 1.468.750 1.484.375 1.492.188 
EVAr  1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 
B%  50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
EVA (N+1)  1.375.000 1.437.500 1.468.750 1.484.375 1.492.188 1.496.094 
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Figure no. 4: Target EVA for an unchanged achieved EVA 
The same author assets that the equation above could add a constant with either positive or 
negative values. The positive value of this constant will raise the target level for the 
economic value added in high competition conditions forcing the managers to make the 
decisions that are appropriate for the increase of EVA. On the other hand, in uncertain 
conditions one can take into account a negative value for the constant. 
EVAtn+1= EVAtn + B% (EVArn - EVAtn) + constant                                                          (4) 
In which: 
Constant – the extra value required by the management  
Below you will find a simulation (table no.4 and figure no. 5) of the calculation of the EVA 
target for five years taking into account a positive level of the constant presented 
previously. 
 
Table no. 4: The target of EVA with a positive constant 
   N  N+1 N+2 N+3 N+4 N+5 
EVA 
(N)  1.250.000 1.475.000 1.587.500 1.643.750 1.671.875 1.685.938 
EVAr  1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.500.000 
B%  50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Cons.  100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
EVA 
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Figure no. 5: EVA target with a positive constant 
The negative value of the constant denotes an excessively prudent level in establishing the 
EVA target, much below the actual value. (table no. 5 and figure no. 6). 
Table no. 5: The target of EVA with a negative constant 
   N  N+1  N+2  N+3  N+4  N+5 
EVA (N)  1.250.000 1.275.000  1.287.500 1.293.750  1.296.875 1.298.438 
EVAr  1.500.000 1.500.000  1.500.000 1.500.000  1.500.000 1.500.000 
B%  50% 50%  50% 50%  50% 50% 
constanta  -100.000 -100.000  -100.000 -100.000  -100.000 -100.000 
EVA (N+1)  1.275.000 1.287.500  1.293.750 1.296.875  1.298.438 1.299.219 
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The use of absolute variation of the economic value added  
Another incentive calculation method (Young and O’Byrne, 2000) by EVA modification is 
the following: 
Incentive = x% * EVA + y% * ΔEVA                        (5) 
In which: 
x% - percentage of the economic value added, if EVA is positive, and 0% if EVA is 
negative and  
y% - percentage from the EVA modification. y% is bigger than x%. 
Percentages are established in accordance with the required performance levels of each 
company. (table no. 6 and figure no. 7) 
Table no. 6: Calculation of the bonus through variation of EVA 
   N N+1  Percentage  variation 
EVA     1.250.000     1.400.000   16,67% 
ΔEVA        250.000       150.000   -40% 
x%  1% 2%  100% 
y%  6% 5%  -16,67% 
Bonus             27.500           35.500  29,09% 
EVA incentive             12.500           28.000  124% 









Figure no. 7: Bonus calculation system 
The yearly modification of incentives was of 8,000 lei representing an increase of 29.09%. 
The incentive granted due to the EVA increase rose by 124%, thus limiting the effects of 
the incentive granted on the basis of the EVA decrease by 50%. An important role in the 
incentive modification is played by the two percentage values, x% and y%. Thus, x% 
doubled its value during the analyzed period while y% dropped by 16.67%. Even if the 
percentage values are materialized by the negotiation between shareholders and the 
management team, their establishment must be based on calculation and projection in order 
to carefully notice how calculation leads to performance increase.  
The presented situation demonstrates the significance of the percentage establishment with 
a view to incentive granting as well as of the level of the granted incentives in case of high Amfiteatru Economic recommends  AE 
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performance levels.  The multinationals that implemented this type of system even 
penalized management for negative levels of EVA or used „bonus banks”. Basically, if 
during one year, the management gets high performance levels, it obtains only a part of the 
incentive while the other part will be placed in an account and granted or withdrawn in 
accordance with the performance levels reached during the following year. This method 
determines an emphasis placed on value maximization and an increase of the long-term 
performance.   
The modern approach of incentive granting through economic value added  
The use of EVA in incentive granting for company management led to the development of 
the calculation method.  
Incentive = target incentive + y%(ΔEVA - EVAma)                                                           (6) 
In which: 
EVAem – expected modification of the economic value added  
Below we are showing an example of incentive calculation granted for several periods 
(table no.7 and figure no. 8) 
Table no. 7: Calculation of the bonus based on the modern approach 
   N  N+1 N+2 N+3 N+4 N+5 
ΔEVA  250.000 150.000 210.000 220.000 180.000 190.000 
EVAma  200.000 200.000 200.000 200.000 200.000 200.000 
Target bonus  10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 
y%  5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Bonus rewarded  12.500 7.500  10.500 11.000 9.000  9.500 
 
 
Figure no. 8: Comparison between the bonuses rewarded and target bonus 
 
The use of the average economic profit indicator at the value of 1 leu of invested capital for 
the granting of incentives. 
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Below we are proposing a calculation method for company management incentives which 
takes into consideration both the EVA indicator and the average economic profit at the 
value of 1 leu of invested capital. Imposing some conditions concerning the value creation 
is not enough unless the ratio between the economic value added and the invested capital is 
not included in the calculation.  
The suggested model is: 
Incentive = x% x EVA + (ep – ep target) x EVA 
in which: 
x% - is the negotiated percentage for the calculation of the incentive as part of EVA 
ep – is the average economic profit at the value of 1 leu of invested capital during the 
current year  
ep target – is the economic profit target at the value of 1 leu of invested capital in the 
beginning of the year 
The main condition for the incentive to be granted is that the economic value added should 
be positive. (table no. 8)  
Table no. 8: Calculation of the bonus based on the proposed model 
No. Elements  N  N+1  N+2  N+3 
1. Invested  capital  2.500.000 2.600.000 3.000.000  2.800.000 
2. WACC  0  0  0  0 
3. NOPAT  700.000  840.000  600.000  800.000 
4.  Cost of capital 600.000  650.000  690.000  784.000 
5. EVA  100.000  190.000  (90.000)  16.000 
6. EVA/Ki  4%  7%  -3%  1% 
7. target  EVA/Ki  5%  5%  5%  5% 
8. x%  7%  7%  7%  7% 
9. Bonus  6.000  17.685  0  411 
In the presented example, in the last two years of analysis, the bonus rose from 6,000 lei to 
17,685 lei as a consequence of having exceeded the target for the average economic profit 
at the value of 1 leu of invested capital.   
The limits that are applied to this method of incentive granting for management are 
generated by the value management’s application at company level. Thus, significant 
results, both in performance measurement and created value, and the incentive granting for 
management can be obtained by using EVA as a basic indicator. By using EVA, the 
average economic profit at the value of 1 leu of invested capital can be calculated along 
with the method of incentive granting presented above. 
 
Conclusions 
The necessity of correlating the shareholders’ specific targets with those of the management 
is obvious. In our opinion, the limitation of the negative effects of the moral hazard can be 
achieved by a consistent implementation of a set of rules for incentive granting with the 
value creation indicators playing a central role. Even if during high volatility periods Amfiteatru Economic recommends  AE 
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financial markets behave inefficiently, on a long term basis the assessment of management 
performance closely related to the created value is considered the strategic method to be 
adopted in order to assure that the investors’ interests are met.  
As the use of a single indicator in assessing performance implies some objective 
limitations, we intend to further develop and validate a reliable indicators system for the 
correlation of real performance generated by management action with both the size and the 
form under which incentives granted to the company management are granted. 
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